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NOTICE

Finding Gold in the Rainbow
Rights Movement
Shayna S. Cook
RAINBOW RIGHTS: THE ROLE OF LAWYERS AND COURTS IN THE
LESBIAN AND GAY CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT. By Patricia A. Cain.

Boulder: Westview Press. 2000. Pp. xi, 288. $30.

In her history of the past fifty years of the gay and lesbian civil
rights movement, Patricia Cain1 recounts the litigation successes and
failures that contributed to the legal status of gays and lesbians in the
United States today. Clearly an insider who has marched with the
movement every step of the way, Cain provides a comprehensive ac
count of all fronts of the battle in state and federal courts since 1950.
But while Rainbow Rights serves as a good primer on the legal chal
lenges and the key themes uniting them, the book reads like an ac
count of a struggle ending in defeat - not, as Cain describes, "a his
tory of the litigation that has been central to the progress" of the
movement (p. 9; emphasis added). Cain's focus on the movement's
losses - most notably Bowers v. Hardwick2 - obscures the signifi
cance of its gains and, consequently, depicts the movement's future as
overly bleak. As a veteran of the movement, Cain seems more com
fortable recounting setbacks and lost opportunities than providing an
optimistic prescription for the future.
Cain tells the history of Rainbow Rights chronologically, dividing
the chapters into two time periods, 1950-1985 and 1986-present. These
time periods are marked by Bowers v. Hardwick, the 1986 Supreme
Court decision holding that homosexual sodomy is not protected un
der the constitutional right of privacy. Structurally and symbolically,
Hardwick is the defining moment in Cain's history of the gay and les
bian rights movement. Certainly, Hardwick represents the low point of
the movement, with its heart-wrenching 5-4 vote, harmful rhetoric,
and widespread impact. But fifteen years later, it is not so clear that
Hardwick is, or should be, the focal point of the movement's history.

1 . Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
2. 478 U.S. 1 86 (1 986).
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Cain's fascination with Hardwick can be explained by her eleva
tion of private rights over public rights: because Hardwick still governs
same-sex intimacy, the private rights of gays and lesbians lag behind
their public rights. Cain divides each time period into chapters dis
cussing public sphere rights, private sphere rights, and private rights
that become public rights. For Cain, public rights include protection
from discrimination in employment, First Amendment freedom of as
sociation, and the right to access to the political process. Private rights
include parental custody, opportunities for gay couples to adopt chil
dren, and the right to practice consensual same-sex sodomy. Private
relationships between same-sex couples become public when they
seek the state's official recognition of their relationship through mar
riage or domestic partnership laws.3
Cain utilizes the distinction between public and private rights to
contrast the progress of gays and lesbians in each realm during differ
ent time periods. From 1950 to 1985, struggles for public rights were
more successful than those in the private sphere (p. 167). Since
Hardwick, gays and lesbians have struggled to convince courts that the
illegality of sodomy should be irrelevant to other private rights, such
as the right to obtain custody of a child (pp. 246-47). The distinction
between public and private rights relates closely to two other themes
that run through Rainbow Rights: the contrast between arguments
based on sameness versus difference, and the disparate attitude of
courts toward arguments based on homosexual status versus sexual
conduct. Sameness is the idea that similarly situated gay and straight
people should be treated equally, because their differences are not
relevant to their individual merit. As Cain points out, sameness argu
ments are a useful tool for civil rights movements, and the gay and
lesbian civil rights movement is no exception (p. 277). Arguments that
groups should receive protection because of (or despite) their differ
ence are less successful; as the Hardwick case demonstrates. Like pri
vate rights, Cain emphasizes courts' recognition of gays' difference as
crucial to the real success of the gay and lesbian civil rights movement,
because sameness arguments "devalue the very thing that makes us
who we are" (p. 277). Similarly, while courts have been willing to pro
tect gays and lesbians from discrimination based on their status as
gays, they will not protect any related conduct - even if that conduct
is simply suspected or assumed (p. 187). Since Hardwick, gay rights

3. This mixture of public and private rights is somewhat unique to the gay rights movement as compared to other civil rights movements, as Cain mentions in Chapter 1:
The lesbian and gay civil rights movement will likely surpass both the race and gender
equality movements in the number of cases that challenge the private/public divide. This
arena, this crossover space between private and public, is the arena in which the lesbian and
gay civil rights movement will need to break new ground.

P. 40.

May 2001)

The Rainbow Rights Movement

1421

lawyers have had to argue that their clients' status as gay or lesbian
was unrelated to any illegal conduct (p. 192). In Cain's opinion, pro
tection of status without protection of conduct is meaningless, because
"[l]esbian and gay identity has always been connected to choices about
sexual intimacy. To protect the person and not the choice often
seemed pointless" (p. 192).
Cain uses these three interrelated themes to demonstrate that, his
torically, gays and lesbians have received more protection from courts
when making arguments based on being treated differently than simi
larly situated heterosexuals in the public rights arena than when ar
guing for protection on the basis of their status alone. Cain's dissatis
faction with the success of the movement stems from her belief that
private rights, including the protection of intimate conduct and an ac
knowledgment of gays as different, are more fundamental to gays' and
lesbians' identity. Thus, regardless of the movement's gains in the
public rights arena, Cain's apparent frustration with the stagnation
and even regression in the realm of private rights - which follows
each chapter on public rights - minimizes the successes. Cain's belief
that private rights are crucial to the recognition of gays a:nd lesbians as
equal citizens4 renders her history of the rainbow rights movement a
disheartened one. The movement's successes in the public rights
arena, however, have led to important improvements in the lives of
gays and lesbians, and their positive impact extends beyond the public
realm into the private.
Ironically, while Cain's view of the state of the movement today
seems somewhat jaded, her vision of the movement's lawyers is stead
fastly admiring and awestruck.5 She does not question any of the stra
tegic decisions to pursue litigation, but merely describes the fight and,
typically, the subsequent loss. Perhaps her personal involvement in the
movement is to blame for this lack of critical analysis, although she
never indicates overtly that she is more than a supporter and a scholar

4. See, for example, Cain's discussion of private rights in her conclusion:
The claim to be part of humanity should be the driving argument in the lesbian and gay civil
rights movement as it has been in other civil rights movements. And our argument, as with
race, should be that gays are fully human, not despite our gayness, but because of it. To
make this argument, lesbian and gay rights advocates need to focus on what it is that makes
us gay. And that, I believe, requires us to focus on sex and intimacy. We need to make the
private more public.
Pp. 285-86.
5. Cain clearly admires public interest lawyers:
A person has to have something special to be a public interest lawyer who fights for rights on
behalf of a group that has consistently been denied those rights by the establishment. Indi
vidual lawyers in earlier movements have been called crusaders and heroes. Such descrip
tions are equally applicable to the lawyers who have fought for lesbian and gay civil rights.
Civil rights lawyers are visionaries who are passionate about their visions and they are con
sumed with the energy and blind faith needed to turn these visions into reality.
P. 46. This admiration explains why Cain is hesitant to critique these lawyers' decisions.
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of the movement.6 Regardless, Cain's refusal to question past choices
renders her history incomplete. Most glaringly, Cain never questions
the wisdom of the strategy that led to the Hardwick decision, "the
nemesis of the lesbian and gay civil rights movement" (p. 244).
This Notice identifies the source of Cain's disenchanted view of the
history of the gay and lesbian civil rights movement and offers a more
hopeful interpretation of the events she discusses. Part I highlights
some of the movement's early public successes that provided meaning
ful protections to gays and lesbians. Part II focuses on Bowers v.
Hardwick, the Supreme Court case that Cain considers the pivotal
moment of the movement thus far, and discusses both the gay and les
bian civil rights lawyers' decision to challenge the sodomy laws and the
aftermath of the Court's decision. Part III analyzes the latter chapters
of the book, which discuss victories and defeats since Hardwick, and
suggests that the future of the movement may not be as bleak as Cain
leads the reader to believe. This Notice concludes that, while the gay
and lesbian civil rights movement may not have progressed as far as
the movement's insiders might have hoped, it has indeed come a long
way in the past fifty years, and there is hope for the movement.'s future
as well.
I.

GLIMMERS OF HOPE IN THE PUBLIC RIGHTS ARENA

One strength of Cain's history of the gay and lesbian civil rights
movement is that it is simultaneously comprehensive and accessible.
Indeed, accessibility seems to be one of Cain's goals in writing the
book, as she seeks to reach a wider audience than legal insiders.7 But
she does not allow her pursuit of accessibility to get in the way of her
detailed history of the past fifty years of the movement, nor does she
limit her history to the most important Supreme Court decisions. In
stead, she includes important district court and state court decisions in
her history, despite subsequent events that render them seemingly
trivial. Because Cain's history is so inclusive, the reader gains a broad
perspective on how far the movement has really come. The reader's
growing awareness of the extent to which life for gays and lesbians has
progressed contrasts with Cain's own pessimism. This Part highlights
several of the early victories that Cain discusses, mainly in the public
rights arena, and emphasizes how essential these victories were to gay
life and identity. The importance of these early victories will become
6. Cain's intimate involvement in the gay and lesbian civil rights movement is revealed
through the footnotes, in which she indicates that she was a member of the Board of Direc
tors of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, arguably the most important player in
the movement. P. 72 n. 41.

7. P. 9 ("I also hope to demystify litigation and court decisions for nonlawyers who are
interested in gay and lesbian rights. Thus, although this book may be more easily read by
lawyers and law students, it is written for a broader audience as well.").
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evident in Parts II and III, which discuss Cain's overly defeatist focus
on Hardwick and other denials of private rights, and her consequently
discouraging message about the movement's future.
To understand the significance of the early public rights successes
in improving the daily lives of gays and lesbians, consider what life was
like for gays and lesbians in the 1950s. Cain describes this state of be
ing as "captivity," because gays and lesbians had to leave their homo
sexual identity at home and remain closeted in public (p. 74). Given
this backdrop, establishing public places for gays to congregate and
build a community, and thereby to "develop a firmer sense of iden
tity," was crucial (pp. 76-77). Gay bars became the key congregating
sites, "the single most important center of lesbian and gay community"
(p. 76), and Cain analogizes the role of such bars in the gay and les
bian civil rights movement to that of black churches in the black civil
rights movement (p. 89). Not only were these bars a sanctuary where
gays and lesbians felt safe being openly gay, but they allowed the gay
community to strengthen itself socially and politically.8
In response to the proliferation of gay bars after World War II,
many states and municipalities adopted regulations that explicitly or
implicitly outlawed such bars.9 The "first successful gay rights case in
America" (p. 80) involved a challenge to the revocation of the Black
Cat Bar's license in San Francisco because "persons of known homo
sexual tendencies patronized said premises and used said premises as a
meeting place" (p. 79). In 1951, the California Supreme Court over
turned the revocation, distinguishing between "meeting for purely so
cial and harmless purposes" and the "doing of illegal or immoral acts"
- between homosexual status and conduct - and holding that homo
sexuals have a right to access public spaces under California's civil
rights statutes.10 Following that case, the California legislature
amended the statute to allow for revocation of liquor licenses if the
bar served as a gathering place for "sexual perverts."11 The California
Supreme Court struck down this statute as well in 1959, holding that

8. P. 76 ("[B]ar communities were not only the center of sociability and relaxation in the
gay world, they were also a crucible for politics." (quoting ELIZABETH LAPOVSKY
KENNEDY & MADELINE D. DAVIS, BOOTS OF LEATHER, SLIPPERS OF GOLD: THE
HISTORY OF A LESBIAN COMMUNITY 29 (1993))).

9. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW 78-80 (1999). Professor Eskridge analogizes
these aggressive antihomosexual campaigns to witch-hunts and compares them to similar
campaigns in Nazi Germany from 1933 to 1945. Id. at 59-83. As examples, Eskridge discusses
police enforcement of laws prohibiting same-sex intimacy in many cities after World War II,
including police stakeouts, decoy operations, and police raids. Id. at 63.
1 0. P. 81 (quoting Stoumen v. Reilly, 234 P.2d 969, 971(Cal. 1951)).
11. P. 81 (quoting 1955 Cal. Stat. Ch. 1217).
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catering to homosexuals was not "good cause" for revoking a liquor
license under the California constitution.12
Similar challenges to revocation of gay bars' licenses under state
statutes were brought in other states, with mixed results. The highest
courts of both New York and New Jersey held that cities could not re
voke the licenses of bars solely because they provided a place for gays
and lesbians to congregate.13 Florida, however, upheld the constitu
tionality of a Miami ordinance that prohibited bar owners from al
lowing gays to congregate, reasoning that enabling gays to gather in
creases the likelihood that they will engage in illegal sodomy.14
Additionally, as Cain notes, even the states that acknowledged gays'
right to congregate implicitly upheld states' right to revoke licenses
because of immoral or illegal conduct that took place within the bars,
leaving open the possibility of police raids (p. 89). In 1969, one such
raid - on the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in Greenwich Village - re
sulted in riots that "marked the beginning of the modern lesbian and
gay civil rights movement" (p. 91).
Given the risk of such raids, Cain is skeptical about the real import
of the favorable rulings that upheld the right of gays and lesbians to
congregate, despite her acknowledgment that gay bars played a crucial
political and social role in the civil rights movement. Her dissatisfac
tion results partly from the risk of police monitoring of conduct at the
bars and some courts' conflation of status and conduct in denying pro
tection to the bar owners. Moreover, she seems disappointed that
courts did not go further to permit conduct to occur at the bars. Her
disappointment implies a belief that protection of status without cor
responding protection of conduct is merely illusory. Furthermore, she
does not seem to consider these challenges part of the gay and lesbian
civil rights movement at all, because the challenges were usually
brought not by gay patrons but by bar owners, so the gay and lesbian
community was not involved in the cases.15 Perhaps Cain does not feel
that the movement "owns" these successes, regardless of their sym
bolic and practical import, and consequently does not give them due
credit.

12. P. 81 (discussing Vallerga v. Dep't of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 347 P.2d 909, 912
(Cal. 1959) ).
13. Pp. 84-85 (discussing Kerma Restaurant Corp. v. State Liquor Auth., 233 N.E.2d
833, 855 (N.Y. 1967) and One Eleven Wines & Liquors, Inc. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverage
Control, 235 A.2d 12, 18 (N. J. 1967)).
14. P. 88 (discussing Inman v. City of Miami, 197 So.2d 50 (Fla. App. 1967), cert. denied,
201 So.2d 895 (Fla. 1967), and cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968)).
15. P. 77-78 ("It is difficult to assess the importance or relevance of these early gay. bar
cases in the overall battle for lesbian and gay rights, since the victories belonged, for the
most part, to the bar owners. In addition, the legal fight in support of gay bars was not a co
ordinated one and the gay and lesbian community was not itself an active participant in the
development of the case law. ").

May 2001]

The Rainbow Rights Movement

1425

Another area of important early successes that strengthened gay
and lesbian communities was college student groups' fight for the right
to associate on campus. These student groups used the First Amend
ment freedom of association to challenge university officials' refusal to
recognize their status or to allow them to utilize university facilities. In
1972, a Georgia district court was the first to hold that these officials'
conduct violated gays' freedom of association,16 and subsequent fed
eral courts unanimously followed suit, despite the criminalization of
sodomy in the state (pp. 92-98). The Supreme Court has never granted
certiorari on the issue.17 These decisions represent the federal courts'
willingness and ability to distinguish between homosexual conduct
(illegal in many states) and status, regardless of university officials'
appeal that gay and lesbian events would inevitably lead to criminal
conduct (p. 96-97). While Cain acknowledges these victories, she
minimizes their significance by attributing the success both to favor
able precedent outside of the gay rights arena and the strength of the
First Amendment (p. 98).18 But there was no guarantee that earlier
groups' successes would translate into rights for gays and lesbians, so it
is significant that courts unanimously accepted this translation.
The case for equal employment rights for homosexuals has been,
and continues to be, considerably less successful, but an early victory
for federal civil service employees deserves mention. Under the Civil
Service Act, codified in the early twentieth century, civil service em
ployees can only be fired for cause.19 In 1969, the U.S. Court of Ap
peals for the District of Columbia interpreted the cause requirement
to mean that homosexuality and homosexual conduct were not suffi
cient reasons to fire an employee unless they were connected to the
employee's fitness for service (pp. 108-09). This holding was based on
both statutory interpretation and due process. Congress codified this
"nexus requirement" in 1978 (p. 111). Although Cain acknowledges
that this statute represents the "clearest success in employment dis
crimination cases," she treats .it as a muted victory because of the
myriad of ways in which courts can construe homosexuality - espe-

16. Pp. 94-96 (discussing Wood v. Davison, 351 F.Supp. 543 (N.D. Ga. 1972)).
17. Much to the dismay of Justice Rehnquist, who dissented to one such denial of certio
rari because, "[f]rom the point of view of the University . . . the question is more akin to
whether those suffering from measles have a constitutional right, in violation of quarantine
regulations, to associate together and with others who do not presently have measles, in or
der to urge repeal of a state law providing these measles sufferers to be quarantined."
Ratchford v. Gay Lib., 434 U.S. 1084 (1978), denying cert. in Gay Lib. v. Univ. of Mo., 558
F.2d 848(8th Cir. 1977).
18. The favorable precedent Cain refers to is Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), in
which the Supreme Court held that Students for a Democratic Society ("SDS") had a right
to recognition and facilities.
19. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1167 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (discussing the require
ments of the Civil Service Act).
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cially homosexual conduct - to affect work performance (p. 110).20
Moreover, she seems disappointed in the court's legal analysis because
it was based on due process instead of equal protection. Thus, future
employment discrimination plaintiffs could not use the case as prece
dent for equal protection arguments that gays constitute a suspect
class or that their fundamental right to free speech was violated by a
policy of imposed silence (pp. 123-25). While equal protection chal
lenges to the exclusion of gays from the U.S. military, for instance,
were indeed unsuccessful (pp. 117-22), it is unlikely that those failures
stemmed from gays' successes in the civil service arena. More impor
tantly, these early successes paved the way for city and state legislators
to ban discrimination against gays and lesbians in city and state em
ployment and, eventually, in private employment as well.21
These early successes in the gay and lesbian civil rights movement
may not have been monumental, nor did they ensure success in chal
lenges for private rights, such as the right to same-sex intimacy or cus
tody rights of gay and lesbian parents (pp. 137-42, 148-50). But Cain
accords these successes surprisingly little significance. She allows the
movement's failures in the private rights realm to overshadow the
public rights successes, as though she believes that accomplishments in
recognition of status are negated by continued regulation of conduct.
Given the far greater success in the public than in the private realm,
this emphasis renders Cain's history pessimistic. An alternative inter
pretation might emphasize the importance of the early victories, which
symbolize how far the movement has come since 1950. Cain's compre
hensive account allows the reader to appreciate this progress, even
though Cain herself seems unimpressed by it.

20. For example, Cain discusses the case of John Singer, a civil service employee who
was fired for being gay. The Ninth Circuit upheld the firing because, by speaking out pub
licly about his homosexuality and attempting to marry a man, Singer brought discredit to the
government and interfered with the government's interest in efficiency. P. 110 (discussing
Singer v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 530 F.2d 247 (9th Cir. 1976)). Singer's case was decided before
Congress codified the nexus requirement, and the Supreme Court subsequently vacated it.
As Cain notes, it is possible that such conduct may still be grounds for firing if it interferes
with the gay employee's relations with other employees or otherwise disrupts his job per
formance.P. 110.
21. ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 130 and Appendix B2 ("More than forty cities, including
almost all the nation's largest, adopted similar policies [banning sexual orientation discrimi
nation in city employment] between 1971 and 1984.. . . In parallel fashion, most of these
foregoing jurisdictions considered broader measures to prohibit sexual orientation discrimi
nation by private employers as well. ").
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BOWERS V. HARDWICK

A ND ITS LEGACY

As Cain tells the story, if any doors were cracked open before
1986, the Supreme Court slammed them shut in Bowers v . Hardwick22
by giving future courts a justification for denying both public and pri
vate rights to gays and lesbians on the basis that they engage in crimi
nal conduct. Although Hardwick was technically about sodomy, it was
essentially the Court's stamp of approval on discrimination against
gays and lesbians: "Discrimination was at the core of the Hardwick
decision. Although the case was not litigated as an equal protection
case and, on its face, said nothing about discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation, lesbian and gay rights litigators immediately under
stood the case's reach" (p. 184). That reach, as Cain describes in the
latter chapters of her book, extended to matters such as child custody,
marriage rights, and employment discrimination. By organizing her
book around Hardwick as the defining case, despite earlier and later
successes, Cain dooms the story of the gay and lesbian civil rights
movement to one of defeat.
Although Cain chooses Hardwick as the focal point of her history
of the gay and lesbian civil rights movement, she does not place the
same priority on explaining the lawyers' strategy behind the sodomy
challenges. The lawyers in the gay and lesbian civil rights movement
made a conscious decision to focus on challenging state sodomy stat
utes. Cain acknowledges that "mainstream lawyers and activists have
not always understood" this choice (p. 170). She explains the decision
on an ideological level, arguing that sodomy statutes legitimized dis
crimination against gays.23 Sodomy statutes allow people and courts to
classify homosexuals as criminals and thereby discriminate against
them on many different levels, denying them status based on the as
sumption that they engage in criminal conduct. This justification
makes logical sense, and Cain has given enough examples of such con
flation of status and conduct in the previous chapters to bolster its ve
racity. Additionally, Cain points out that sodomy laws represented the
state's power to repress gay and lesbian identity, which provided the
basis for the gay liberation movement in its original grassroots begin
nings (p. 171).
. Although Cain adequately explains the significance of sodomy
laws as the foundation for other discriminatory laws, she does not dis
cuss the choice of sodomy challenges as a litigation strategy or the
counterargument that such challenges might have been risky. As Cain
� 2. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
23. P. 280 ("Modem gay rights litigators focused on state sodomy statutes as their pri
mary target because these statutes worked to endorse discrimination against gay men and
lesbians.").
,,
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notes elsewhere, avoiding the Supreme Court can be a more prudent
strategy.24 For one thing, the threat of prosecution for sodomy was
miniscule, as sodomy statutes were rarely enforced. As Cain acknowl
edges, "[i]n most states, the issue was more academic than real" (p.
232). So few people were actually injured by sodomy laws that it was
often difficult for plaintiffs to establish standing to challenge the laws
(pp. 137-38). Moreover, challenging sodomy laws does not seem to
have been a wise choice for the delicate first step for a civil rights
movement without a positive Supreme Court decision under its belt to
have taken.
Historians of the African-American civil rights movement have re
counted the painstakingly tedious steps the lawyers for the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP")
took on their way to the important Supreme Court victories.25 For in
stance, the crusade for desegregated public schools began by chal
lenging segregated buses and moved on to graduate education before
attacking public elementary schools, issues that are seemingly less
threatening (or at least easier to talk about) than sex.26 Only after win
ning victories for public rights at the Supreme Court level did the
NAACP press the Court to recognize the private right to interracial
marriage.27
Another reason the sodomy strategy seems riskier than, for in
stance, segregation challenges is that arguments based on equal oppor
tunity and equal access implicate status, while sodomy challenges im
plicate conduct, which is less likely to be constitutionally protected.
The fact that gay rights lawyers brought the sodomy challenges under
the right to privacy of the Due Process Clause, not the Equal Protec24. Cain discusses avoidance as a legal strategy in Chapter 8, when she explains lawyers'
avoidance of a final Supreme Court decision on custody challenges based on the Equal Pro
tection Clause: "So long as the Palmore/Romer argument is meeting with success in some
state courts, litigators are quite s�nsible to avoid the risk that the Supreme Court might de
molish that particular legal strategy." P.252.
25. See generally RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1975); MARK V. TuSHNET, THE
NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
Tushnet cautions against viewing the NAACP's litigation strategy as a deftly crafted plan:
Most commentators on the NAACP's litigation have seen the campaign as a combination of
strategic planning and successful implementation ....Thus, viewing the campaign in the light
cast by its results, Richard Kluger tends to tell a story of unproblematic success: that the
campaign was rationally and without fundamental error designed to maximize the chance
that the NAACP would win.
TUSHNET, supra, at 144. Instead, Tushnet notes, the strategy was fluid, identifying certain
goals of the movement and melding to meet those goals.
·

26. Pp. 18-19; see KLUGER, supra note 25, at 14 (discussing the NAACP's decision in
1947 to challenge the segregated bus system: "The way to start, NAACP strategists agreed,
was with buses. It would be the least inflammatory step, and the hardest request for the
whites to deny"; the NAACP won that case in a federal district court in South Carolina in
1948); pp. 260-84 (discussing the attack on segregated graduate schools).
27. P. 23; see also Loving v.Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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tion Clause, is significant as well.28 Traditionally, the right to privacy
has been interpreted to protect the basic values that society deems
fundamental.29 Thus, courts look to history and tradition to see if a
right should be protected under substantive due process, as the
Hardwick Court did. Given the role of tradition, the right to privacy is
not the ideal tool for social change. The Equal Protection Clause, on
the other hand, protects disadvantaged groups from tradition and the
deeply held values of the majority.30 In 1986, as Cain points out, the
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, the major gay and les
bian civil rights organization, had no equal protection claims on its
docket (p. 185). The distinction between equal protection and due
process claims may explain why, when the Supreme Court awarded
the gay rights movement its first victory ten years later, the decision
was based on the Equal Protection Clause.
On the other hand, there were compelling reasons to support the
sodomy strategy, although they do not excuse Cain's failure even to
discuss the criticism. First, because courts declined to declare sexual
orientation a suspect classification, they summarily dismissed many
earlier equal protection cases (p. 123). Additionally, gay rights litiga
tors won some early successes on the sodomy front, and an affirmative
decision in Hardwick on the Supreme Court level may not have

28. The Bowers case did not involve an equal protection argument. P. 177 ("The
[Supreme Court] brief in the Hardwick case focused narrowly on the right of privacy. ").
29. See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the Relationship between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 161, 1 170-71 (1988):
From its origin, the Due Process Oause has often been interpreted so as to protect tradi
tionally recognized rights from state and federal power. Nothing in the text of the clause
compels such a conclusion, and on this point as on others history is ambiguous. But in its ju
dicial interpretation, the clause has frequently been understood as an effort to restrict short
term or shortsighted deviations from widely held social norms; it has an important backward
looking dimension. For purposes of due process, the inquiry has tended to be the common
law, Anglo-American practice, or the status quo. The Due Process Oause is thus closely as
sociated with the view that the role of the Supreme Court is to limit dramatic and insuffi
ciently reasoned change, to protect tradition against passionate majorities, and to bring a
more balanced and disinterested perspective to bear on legislation.
But see ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 142-43 (criticizing Sunstein's argument that the due pro
cess clause is backward-looking and the equal protection clause is forward-looking, on the
basis that due process claims brought by gays against police procedures in the 1970s "were
more dynamic and forward-looking for gay people than equal protection cases were." Addi
tionally, Eskridge argues that the two clauses are interrelated in sodomy laws because such
laws "not only threaten privacy rights but also discriminate on the basis of sexual orienta
tion, either on their face or in practice.").

30. See Sunstein, supra note 29, at 1174 ("The function of the Equal Protection Clause is
to protect disadvantaged groups, of which blacks are the most obvious case, against the ef
fects of past and present discrimination by political majorities. . . . [T]he Equal Protection
Clause is not rooted in common law or status quo baselines, or in Anglo-American conven
tions. The baseline is instead a principle of equality that operates as a criticism of existing
practice.").
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seemed as improbable as it does in hindsight.31 And success was not
unthinkable: as Cain remembers, the movement was one vote short of
victory, with the deciding vote - Justice Powell - later publicly ad
mitting that his vote to uphold the statute was a mistake (p. 179).
Finally, perhaps the "strategy" was not a strategy at all. There were
many gay rights lawyers throughout the country, bringing many kinds
of challenges, and coordinating a national movement was not as easy
as it had been in the era when the NAACP was the primary legal or
ganization fighting for African-American civil rights (pp. 48-49). But
as Cain tells the story, the sodomy challenge in particular appears to
have been a fairly well-coordinated national campaign, and there was
even a national meeting in 1983 among gay and lesbian legal organiza
tions to coordinate the national strategy for attacking sodomy laws
across the country (pp. 64, 68-69, 169). Additionally, Cain points out
that lawyers for the State of Georgia, not Hardwick's lawyers, made
the decision to bring the case before the Supreme Court, since the
State was appealing its loss in the Eleventh Circuit (p. 174). But
Hardwick and the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") did
choose to initiate the original case in federal court, seeking a declara
tory judgment that the law was unconstitutional, although the charges
against Hardwick had been dropped (p. 172). At the very least, there
are valid reasons to question the sodomy strategy - reasons that Cain
might have addressed instead of exiling such criticism to the land of
"[m]ainstream" (p. 170) and declaring the movement's lawyers "cru
saders" (p. 46).
As Cain painfully recounts, the Hardwick decision was a heart
breaking "betrayal" for gay rights lawyers (p. 179). In addition to the
Court's actual holding, there were several regrettable "if only. . ."
events. Justice Thurgood Marshall's strategic vote to grant certiorari,
added to the votes of three conservative Justices, provided the final
vote necessary.for the Supreme Court to hear the case (p. 174). Justice
Marshall took the risk in the hope that the Court would affirm the
Eleventh Circuit.32 The other "if only" was Justice Powell's infamous
swing vote in response to pressure from Justice Rehnquist (p. 178).
The legacy of the Court's holdings - since there is no fundamental
right to engage in homosexual sodomy, a state must only show a ra
tional basis for outlawing it, and promotion of public morality is one
such rational basis - was far reaching (p. 179). The Court's charge
that states could constitutionally criminalize private, consensual ho
mosexual conduct led lower courts to link homosexual status with

31. P. 142; see, e.g., People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (N.Y. 1980) (holding the New
York sodomy statute unconstitutional). The Supreme Court denied certiorari on this case,
leading gay rights lawyers to suspect that the Court may have believed the right to privacy
protected sodomy (p. 142).
32. P. 174(referring to Justice Marshall's papers, released in 1993).
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criminal conduct and deny protection to gays and lesbians based on
their assumed status as criminals, in areas ranging from custody deci
sions (p. 245) to the military's exclusion policy (pp. 196-202). The deci
sion also diminished the strength of arguments that homosexuals
should be protected as a suspect class by the Equal Protection Clause.
For example, the D.C. Circuit equated homosexual status with crimi
nal conduct to deny strict scrutiny in an employment discrimination
case, arguing that "[i]t would be quite anomalous, on its face, to de
clare status defined by conduct that states may constitutionally crimi
nalize as deserving of strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause."33 Lawyers were forced to rebut the presumption that all ho
mosexuals engaged in homosexual conduct, which was difficult be
cause "[l]esbian and gay identity has always been connected to choices
about sexual intimacy," and such an argument essentially denies gays'
difference (p. 192).
While Cain does not omit the details of the aftermath of
Hardwick's holding, she fails to appreciate fully the impact of the dis
criminatory and hyperbolic language the Court used to describe same
sex intimacy. As Professor William Eskridge has pointed out, the
Court's antigay, moralizing "rhetoric turned the Hardwick decision
into an exemplar of legal homophobia."34 To begin with, although the
Georgia statute outlawed oral and anal sex between both homosexuals
and heterosexuals, the Court defined the issue as "whether the Fed
eral Constitution confers a fundamental right upon homosexuals to
engage in sodomy and hence invalidates the laws of the many States
that still make such conduct illegal and have done so for a very long
time."35 Justice Blackmun's dissent, on the other hand, characterized
the issue not as a fundamental right to homosexual sodomy but as "the
right to be left alone."36 The majority opinion also delegitimized ho
mosexual relationships by distinguishing them from familial ties: "No
connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the one hand
and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated."37 The
final jab at gays and lesbians was the majority's comparison of same
sex intimacy to other crimes, which indicated that the Court saw so lit33. P. 187 (quoting Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
34. EsKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 150; see also Jay Michaelson, On Listening to the Kul
turkampf, or, How America Overruled Bowers v. Hardwick, Even Though Romer v. Evans
Didn't, 49 DUKE L. J. 1559, 1569 (2000) ("Most importantly, although perhaps most difficult
to fit into a doctrinal box, Bowers represented a clear moral statement on the part of the
Supreme Court, and endorsed a set of value judgments about gays and lesbians. . . I believe
it is in this rather ill-defined sociological arena that the true significance of Bowers lies.
Bowers defined the mainstream and the margins . . . . ).
.

"

35. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190(1986).
36. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (.3Iackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. U.S., 277
U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
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tle difference between homosexual relationships and incest that it
feared the inevitable slippery slope result:

Plainly enough, otherwise illegal conduct is not always immunized when
ever it occurs in the home. Victimless crimes, such as the possession and
use of illegal drugs, do not escape the law where they are committed at
home.... And if respondent's submission is limited to the voluntary sex
ual conduct between consenting adults, it would be difficult, except by
fiat, to limit the claimed right to homosexual conduct while leaving ex
posed to prosecution adultery, incest, and other sexual crimes even
though they are committed in the home. We are unwilling to start down
that road.38
These images of gays and lesbians as common criminals and sexual
deviants validated homophobic sentiments throughout the country: "If
the enlightened Justices of our highest court are disgusted by homo
sexuals," Americans asked themselves, "then why shouldn't we be?"
Justice Burger's concurrence offered even more validation to the
moral opposition to homosexuality: he declared adamantly that "[t]o
hold that the act of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a
fundamental right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching"
and referred to sodomy as "an offense of 'deeper malignity' than
rape." 39 Cain's omission of the language used by the Court is disap
pointing, not only because it ignores one aspect of the emotional harm
to gays and lesbians resulting from the case, but also because it misses
the chance to monitor the changing rhetoric after Hardwick. Even if
gay rights lawyers have experienced no overwhelming victories since
Hardwick, they have benefited from increased respect, as evidenced
by the rhetoric of judicial opinions.
As this Part has discussed, there is no escaping the fact that
Hardwick was a considerable setback. But the structure and tone of
Cain's book indicate that none of the victories before or since
Hardwick have mitigated its legacy or undermined the Court's hurtful
language. The next Part will discuss whether or not the gay and lesbian
civil rights movement has· recovered, or will recover, from the
Hardwick decision.
III. NO POT OF GOLD? THE FUTURE OF THE GAY
AND LESBIAN CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT

Although the Supreme Court decided Hardwick fifteen years ago,
Cain's tone in retelling· the story indicates that the "feeling of be
trayal" is still fresh in her memory (p. 179). Cain acknowledges that
there were some positive effects of the decision, such as the gay38. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 195-96.
39. Bowers,· 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger,
COMMENTARIES 215).

J.,

concurring) (quoting 4

W. BLACKSTONE,
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supportive public reaction to the decision,40 but the latter chapters of
the book describe the battles for public and private rights since 1986 as
if the dark cloud of Hardwick still lingers over the movement. As this
Part discusses, however, within the pages are some bright points that
signal that the story is far from finished.
Probably the most important of such victories is the 1996 decision
in Romer v. Evans,41 in which the Supreme Court struck down a ballot
initiative that amended the· Colorado constitution to prevent munici
palities and other governmental entities from enacting antidiscrimina
tion measures protecting gays, lesbians, or bisexuals (p. 202). The
Court used the Equal Protection Clause to find that the amendment
classified homosexuals for no reason other than pure animus, which
does not qualify as a rational basis for the classification, thereby de
nying an entire group access to the political process (p. 210). As Cain
notes, this decision was a victory for the movement for several rea
sons. It demonstrated that gays and lesbians are protected by the
Equal Protection Clause despite the cases construing Hardwick to
preclude equal protection for gays (p. 211). Moreover, it revitalized
the movement and "made it possible for the gay and lesbian civil
rights movement to continue its work" (p. 2 12).
Beyond those signs of victory, though, Cain does not seem optimis
tic about the long-term effects of Romer, stating that "the decision did
not go far enough to create any lasting impediment to antigay forces
around the country" (p. 2 13). The Second Circuit refused to extend
Romer to the military's exclusion policy, despite the fact that its justi
fication - "unit cohesion" - was based on the military's concern
about heterosexuals' prejudice toward th�ir homosexual colleagues.42
The Sixth Circuit declined to apply Romer to a citywide antigay initia
tive, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 4 3 Additionally, Romer
had no positive influence on a subsequent employment 'discrimination
case before the Eleventh Circuit. The court's decision indicated that
Romer was based on status alone, and any conduct at all (such as a de
cision to marry another woman) would remove Romer's protection.44

40. P. 180; see also ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 150 (describing criticism of the Bowers
decision that characterized the judgment as "manipulative, ignorant, inefficient, violent, his
torically inaccurate, misogynistic, authoritarian, and contrary to precedent").
41. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
42. "Whether barring gays from the military is a rational or a prejudicial means of ac
complishing unit cohesion will simply not be questioned by the court. . . . The result under
the Able decision is that the military will only be subjected to meaningful equal protection
scrutiny if it actually says that its motive is based on prejudice, an event unlikely to occur,
given the high-quality legal advice that the Pentagon receives." P. 215-16 (discussing Able v.
United States, 155 F.3d 628 (2d Cir. 1998)).
43. P. 214 (discussing Equality Found. of Greater Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati,
128 F.3d 289 (6th Cir. 1997)).
44. Pp. 219-21 (discussing Shahar v. Bowers, 1 14 F.3d 1 097 (en bane) (11th Cir. 1997)).
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While Cain discusses these negative decisions at length, however,
she relegates a mere paragraph to the decisions that represent
Romer's positive impact. For example, the Seventh Circuit ruled in fa
vor of a boy who sued his school for allowing him to be harassed on
the basis of his sexual orientation and telling him he should have ex
pected such harassment when he was openly gay.45 The court rejected
the defendants' reliance on Hardwick as irrelevant to the boy's equal
protection argument and questioned the vitality of Hardwick in light
of Romer.46 Additionally, the Sixth Circuit held that selective criminal
prosecution on the basis of sexual orientation motivated by animus
violated the Equal Protection Clause. 47 Again, the court held that the
defendants' reliance on Hardwick to justify their discriminatory
treatment was misplaced in light of Romer.48 Acknowledging these vic
tories, Cain concludes that "Romer has clearly opened a door, or per
haps at least a window, for lesbian and gay civil rights lawyers" (p.
222). But these victories, which strengthen the rational basis review
for gays and call into question the continued viability of Hardwick,
seem to represent more than a "window." Cain's skeptical reading of
Romer may simply be the thwarted optimism of a veteran of a civil
rights movement that has experienced agonizing defeat.
A less jaded observer could instead see Romer as a paradigm shift
in the way courts talk about gays and lesbians. Justice Kennedy, writ-

45. P. 221 (discussing Nabozny v. Podlesny, 92 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 1996)). The Seventh
Circuit evaluated the school officials' conduct under rational basis review, but noted that
"[t)here can be little doubt that homosexuals are an identifiable minority subjected to dis
crimination in our society." Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 457. Additionally, the court intimated that it
considered sexual orientation to be an immutable characteristic: "We express no opinion on
whether sexual orientation is an 'obvious, immutable, or distinguishing' characteristic. How
ever, it does seem d ubious to suggest that someone would choose to be homosexual, absent
some genetic predisposition, given the considerable discrimination leveled against homo
sexuals." Id. at 457 n.10.
46. Nabozny, 92 F.3d at 458 ("[R)eliance on Bowers by the defendants in this case is
misplaced. Bowers addressed the criminalization of sodomy. The defendants make no men
tion of sodomy as a motive for their discrimination. To the contrary, defendants offer us no
rational basis for their alleged conduct."). Thus, the court found that the prohibition of sod
omy per se cannot be a justification for discriminating against gays. The court went on to
question the strength of Bowers after Romer: "Of course Bowers will soon be eclipsed in the
area of equal protection by the Supreme Court's holding in Romer v. Evans." Id. at 458 n.
12.
47. P. 222 (discussing Stemler v. City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856 (6th Cir. 1997)). The
court found that "the defendant officers chose to arrest and prosecute her for driving under
the influence because they perceived her to be a lesbian, and out of a desire to effectuate an
animus against homosexuals." Stemler, 126 F.3d at 873.
48. Stemler, 126 F.3d at 873:
(The defendants] argue that as a blanket matter it is always constitutional to discriminate on
the basis of sexual orientation, citing Bowers v. Hardwick. However, Bowers held only that
there is no substantive due process right to engage in homosexual sodomy, and expressly de�
dined to consider an equal protection claim. It is inconceivable that Bowers stands for the
proposition that the state may discriminate against individuals on the basis of their sexual
orientation solely out of animus to that orientation. [citing Romer] [citations omitted].
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ing for the majority in R omer, admonished Colorado for withholding
the protection of the laws from gays and lesbians for no reason other
than "animus."49 This decision labeled gays and lesbians "persons,"
not criminals, and protected them from popularly expressed prejudice.
The majority opinion so angered Justice Scalia that he felt compelled
to write a venomous dissent, reminding the Court that homosexuals
are criminals:

Of course it is our moral heritage that one should not hate any human
beings or class of human beings. But I had thought that one could con
sider certain conduct reprehensible - murder, for example, or polyg
amy, or cruelty to animals - and could exhibit even "animus" toward
such conduct. Surely that is the only sort of "animus" at issue here: moral
disapproval of homosexual conduct, the same sort of moral disapproval
that produced the centuries-old criminal laws that we held constitutional
in Bowers.50
Justice Scalia apparently believed that the Court's decision in R omer
was inconsistent with Hardwick, because states need no rational basis
to justify classifications based on sexual orientation beyond the justifi�
cation provided by Hardwick. Cain calls Scalia's concern "far-fetched"
(p. 212), although other scholars acknowle.dge that R omer at least
poked a hole in Hardwick's logic.51 Perhaps Justice Scalia's reaction
signals that he sensed a rhetorical shift in the majority's tone - from
the pen of his conservative colleague, no less - to one of respect for
gays and lesbians as human beings. Nevertheless, the fact that the
majority rejected Justice Scalia's "moral disapproval" argument repre
sents a significant choice by the Court, one that allowed lower courts
to choose between the outmoded values of Hardwick and more pro
gressive social attitudes.
In her conclusion, Cain identifies one of the movement's obstacles
as "no respect" (p. 282). Unlike the African-American �ivil rights
movement, where courts acknowledged that African Americans
should receive "separate but equal" treatment to whites, and the
49. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632, 635 (1996) ("A State cannot so deem a class of
persons a stranger to its laws.").
50. Romer, 517 U.S. at 644(Scalia, J., dissenting).
51. E.g. , ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 150 ("Although Justice Anthony Kennedy's opin
ion for the Court declined to discuss the earlier decision, the logic of Evans calls Hardwick
into question. To focus sodomy prohibitions on 'homosexual sodomy' alone, as Hardwick
suggested and as ten states have expressly done, is to 'singl[e] out a certain class of citizens
for disfavored legal status' because of popular 'animosity toward the class of persons· af
fected,' contrary to Evans." ) ; Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN . L
REV. 45, 65 (1996) ("[T]he continued force of Hardwick may be undermined by the Court's
more recent pronouncement in Evans that antigay legislation, if unmoored to any identified
harmful conduct, is unconstitutional."). But Professor Eskridge notes that courts seeking to
limit gay rights can constrain Romer to its facts: "Judges are no longer constrained by
Hardwick in equal protection cases and can follow Evans's lead if they choose to do so. But
judges desiring to reject challenges to antigay policies can follow Hardwick and limit Evans
to its unusual facts." ESKRIDGE, supra note 9, at 172.

1436

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 99:1419

women's rights movement, where adverse court decisions were
couched in terms of protection and respect, courts have declared gays
and lesbians immoral and criminal: "Gay rights litigators must attack a
Supreme Court precedent that is totally devoid of any rhetoric of re
spect" (pp. 282-83). Cain acknowledges that Romer contains respectful
rhetoric for gay rights in the public sphere, but not the private sphere:
"While Romer can be cited for the principle that gay men and lesbians
are worthy of equal respect in the public sphere, it does not speak to
private sphere concerns" (p. 283). Her compartmentalization of
Romer's positive rhetorical impact to the public sphere, however, is
inconsistent with her argument that the rhetoric "totally devoid of re
spect" in Hardwick had far-reaching negative effects in both the pri
vate and public spheres and still represents a hurdle for gay rights liti
gators to overcome (p. 283). On the contrary, Baker v . Vermont,52 the
1998 Vermont Supreme Court case holding that, under the Vermont
constitution, the Vermont legislature must provide same-sex couples
with the same rights and benefits as heterosexual married couples,
serves as evidence of Romer's rhetorical impact on the realm of pri
vate rights. The court's language demonstrates clear respect for the
strength and validity of same-sex relationships and, moreover, for gays
and lesbians as human beings:

The past provides many instances where the law refused to see a human
being when it should have. The future may provide instances where the
law will be asked to see a human when it should not. The challenge for
future generations will be to define what is most essentially human. The
extension of the Common Benefits Clause [of the Vermont constitution]
to acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing more, nor
less, than legal protection and security for their avowed commitment to
an intimate and lasting human relationship is simply, when all is said and
done, a recognition of our common humanity.53
The Vermont court's recognition of same-sex relationships as
bearing the same elements as heterosexual marriages, and of gays and
lesbians as sharing common traits as heterosexuals, is a far cry from
the "common criminal" rhetoric of Hardwick.
Even the Supreme Court's recent decision in Boy Sco uts of
America v. Da le,54 which was a defeat for the gay rights movement, did
not return to the hateful rhetoric of Hardwick. The Court held that the
Boy Scouts' First Amendment right to express antigay views by ex
cluding gays was protected from challenge under the New Jersey anti
discrimination and public accommodations statutes. As Cain points
out, the decision is problematic for several reasons, including the

52. 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
53. Baker, 744 A.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
54. 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
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Court's deference to the Boy Scouts and the majority's baffling dis
tinction between a gay Scout leader and a straight but pro-gay leader.55
Cain interprets the decision to indicate that morality is still a valid jus
tification for discriminating against gays, despite R omer (p. 283). But
even Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is careful to couch the idea
of morality in terms of morality as the Boy Scouts of America - a
private organization whose views are protected by the First Amend
ment - sees it, not as society or the Court sees it. In discussing the
Scout Oath and Law requiring Scouts to be "morally straight" and
"clean," the Court acknowledges:

[T]he terms "morally straight" and "clean" are by no means self
defining. Different people would attribute to those terms very different
meanings. For example, some people may believe that engaging in ho
mosexual conduct is not at odds with being "morally straight" and
"clean." And others may believe that engaging in homosexual conduct is
contrary to being "morally straight" and "clean." The Boy Scouts say it
falls within the latter category.56
Fourteen years earlier, or even less, the Court might have made the
connection to Hardwick and concluded that "morally straight" could
not possibly mean "criminal," and considered the question closed.
Additionally, the majority acknowledged the dissent's argument that
the public perception of homosexuality has become more positive:
"Indeed, it appears that homosexuality has gained greater societal ac
ceptance. But this is scarcely an argument for denying First Amend
ment protection to those who refuse to accept these views."57 Such an
admission underscores the fact that this case was about the time
honored First Amendment right to express unpopular ideas, and the
Court acknowledges that homophobia is one such unpopular idea.58
This point should not be overstated; it is clear that this decision was
not a victory for gay rights. But for Cain to conclude that "[t]he only
positive aspect of the Da le majority opinion is that it did not cite
Bowers v. Hardwick as relevant precedent" seems unnecessarily pes
simistic (p. 283).
55. P. 227; see Dale, 530 U.S. at 650-51, 655-56.
56. Dale, 530 U.S. at 650.
57. Dale, 530 U.S. at 660 (citation omitted).
58. Dale, 530 U.S. at 660 ("The First Amendment protects expression, be it of the
popular variety or not. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 105 L. Ed.
342 (1989) (holding that Johnson's conviction for burning the American flag violates the
First Amendment); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 430 (1969)
(holding that a Ku Klux Klan leader's conviction for advocating unlawfulness as a means of
political reform violates the First Amendment). And the fact that an idea may be embraced
and advocated by increasing numbers of people is all the more reason to protect the First
Amendment rights of those who wish to voice a different view."). It is significant that the
two cases the Court cited involved flag-burning and the Ku Klux Klan, two tremendously
unpopular causes, underscoring the Court's acknowledgment of the unpopularity of homo
phobia.
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Along with these rhetorical shifts that indicate a possible trend to
ward courts' acceptance of gays, Cain's final chapters contain other
glimmers of hope. One is the gradual diminution of sodomy laws by
state courts and legislatures (pp. 233-42). These victories, which ren
der Hardwick increasingly irrelevant in practical terms, coupled with
the signals of the rhetorical overruling of Ha rdwick discussed above,
may soon relegate Hardwick to obsolescence. State courts have also
made important steps forward (and some backward, unfortunately) in
the area of family law, from custody decisions (pp. 248-49) to the
Vermont Supreme Court's decision regarding same-sex marriages (pp.
261-63). While the gay and lesbian civil rights movement certainly has
intimidating obstacles to face in terms of lingering prejudice and bad
precedent, it is certainly not trapped under the legacy of Hardwick.
CONCLUSION
Cain's account of legal challenges in the gay and lesbian civil rights
movement is both historically' informative and legally insightful. But
her focus on the Ha rdwick decision make� her analysis overly defeatist
and minimizes the importance of positive developments. Additionally,
her failure to discuss the rhetorical shift in the three major gay rights
decisions by the Supreme Court contributes to her pessimistic tone.
While the in-depth description of past cases is necessary and helpful as
a primer, Cain's focus on Ha rdwick rather than the positive develop
ments before and since · diminishes her ability to offer real hope and
advice for future lawyers in the gay and lesbian civil rights movement.
'

